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  David E. W. Fenner
Abstract
In this paper, I want to argue that what I call "production
theories" - theories that purport to account for the value of a
work of art instrumentally and in terms of something
experienced by audience members in attending to the work are insufficient to account for artistic value. The production
theories I will discuss include those of Monroe Beardsley,
Nelson Goodman, Leo Tolstoy (for lack of a more current pure
affective theory), and Alan Goldman (whose account may be
seen as an amalgam of the first three). The first three of these
theorists represent the most popular and central production
theories, those focused,in the case of Beardsley, on the value
of a work of art grounded in its ability to produce in an
audience member an aesthetic experience; in the case of
Goodman, to produce in an audience member a certain
cognitive experience; and, third, in the case of Tolstoy, to
produce in an audience member a certain emotional state. I
think that none of these theories entirely accounts for artistic
value. Though with others, I reject intrinsic accounts of artistic
value, I think that if instrumental accounts which turn on
producing something in attenders are not entirely sufficient,
there may be another extrinsic value account worth
considering. This paper will make use, in addition to that of
the above named theorists, of the work of George Dickie and
of a recent paper of mine simply entitled "Artistic Value,"[1]
which suffered from an absence of the case I want to try to
make here.
Key Words
production theories, artistic value, audience, Goodman,
Tolstoy, Dickie, Beardsley, Goldman

1. Housekeeping Points
It needs to be made perfectly clear that the value at issue
here is not aesthetic value but artistic value, the value that
works of art have in respect of being works of art. Although
the distinction between artistic value and aesthetic value
breaks down in Beardsley's account, accounts which are
affective (and so, presumably, expressionist) or cognitivist are
solely about works of art. Experiences of many natural objects
(and events), and experiences of many non-art artifactual
objects, can be aesthetic or have a strong aesthetic
component. Indeed, I would wager that most aestheticians
today believe that an aesthetic perspective can be taken to
any object, so long as that object is phenomenal or, in
principle, sensory. So aesthetic value as a category is much
wider than artistic value, since only a small percentage of
artifactual objects are works of art. I will argue, though, that
artistic value is not a species or a subset of aesthetic value.
Some art objects are not commonly viewed from an aesthetic
perspective; I believe that taking an aesthetic perspective to
some artworks is to miss what is most important about those
works as art.

Each of the production theories under discussion here can be
understood as having two distinct functions. One function is
evaluative. One can assess the merits of a work of art through
consideration of the presence and strength of the features on
which these accounts focus. This is something that Dickie
makes evident in his Evaluating Art,[2] at least with regard to
the aesthetic and cognitivist models (chapters four and six,
respectively). If we are using Tolstoy's work as our affective
model, then one need only recall that Tolstoy himself used his
model for evaluation: "And not only is infection [of expressed
feeling] a sure sign of art, but the degree of infectiousness is
also the sole measure of excellence in art."[3] Frankly, the
value-focused nature of each theory is the very point of this
paper, so this is a matter on which no more time need be
spent just now.
The other function is definitional. Each theory defines what
characteristics must be present for an object to be properly
considered a work of art. In the cases of Tolstoy and
Goodman, this is straightforwardly the case. It is less obvious
in Beardsley's, though. However, in a late work (1979),
"Redefining Art," Beardsley writes:
"I say that an artwork is either an arrangement of conditions
intended to be capable of affording an experience with marked
aesthetic character or (incidentally) an arrangement belonging
to a class or type of arrangements that is typically intended to
have this capacity.... I can hasten to add at the moment is
that it is to be understood from the start that the
arrangements I speak of often are created with more than one
intention, but what makes them art, on this definition, is that
the aesthetic intention described above is present and
operative."[4]
This is enough to be able to say that Beardsley's account had
a definitional component.
Would it make sense, given the definitional facet of each of
these views, to look for other production theories that are
grounded in definition? I would consider the "artworld" views
of Arthur Danto here,[5] but they are a bit abstract for the
modesty of the point I want to make, so it would be better to
consider the more concrete Institutional Theory of Art
advanced by Dickie. Dickie writes: "A work of art is an artifact
of a kind created to be presented to an artworld public."[6]
This appears to be a revision to his earlier and perhaps more
famous definition: "A work of art in the classificatory sense is
(1) an artifact (2) a set of the aspects of which has had
conferred upon it the status of a candidate for appreciation by
some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social
institution (the artworld)."[7]
Although there may not be an apparent value component in
this account to exploit in recasting this view as a valueproduction theory, we might import a means by which to
consider it as a value-production or value-teleological theory,
namely one from Aristotle. Aristotle held that the goodness of
an object can be judged on how well it performs its function,
in respect of the sort of thing it is; something is good if it is a
highly functioning one of its kind. If it is legitimate to bring
this to bear on art theories, then perhaps a good work of art,
following Dickie and Aristotle, is a work that functions highly

as "an artifact of a kind created to be presented to an artworld
public."
Out of this account, we might be able to wrestle the notion
that if a work of art is wellaccepted by the artworld - with
"accepted" being the productive end of being presented - then
it is a good work. But then the question has to be: Accepted
how? What is it that constitutes the nature of the acceptance?
And with that question, we move back down to the level of
detail offered in the three theories with which we started. Even
if I take massive liberties with Dickie's account, it seems that
coherent value accounts cannot come from definitional
accounts wholesale. This gives me confidence that the scope
of my argument is about right.
If my focus is on discussing what makes works of art valuable,
I do need a theory of what counts as a work of art. I need a
means of demarcating the range of my claims, and so here I
will turn to Danto's artworld theory. I reject artworld theories
as sufficient for providing accounts of the value of art, but
since some non-question-begging means of accounting for my
subject matter is necessary, I accept the "classification
function" of the artworld as expressed in Danto's work.
Using an artworld theoretic approach to classifying what
counts as art is to limit the range of my discussion and the
range of my claims to the range of the artworld. "Artworlds," if
a plural use of that term is appropriate, have boundaries that
most likely are coextensive with boundaries of culture. A
European-American artworld may at times overlap with an
East Asian artworld or with a Middle Eastern artworld, but
judging from what may count as a member of the canon of the
European-American artworld and what may count as a
member of the canon of the East Asian artworld, and judging
from the sorts of aesthetic and artistic sensibilities that seem
prevalent in (e.g.) these two spheres, it seems the most
honest position is to allow the pluralization, to speak of
"artworlds."
To take a step further, it may not even make sense, relative to
some cultures or societies, to speak of an "artworld" in those
cases where a particular culture or society has no objects that
are relevantly like the objects European-Americans take to be
works of art. That is, there may be cultures or societies which
do not have "art" and "non-art" as part of their ontologies, and
so all theory about art and artworlds would be meaningless as
applied to them.
If this is the case, then my use of Danto's artworld theory for
circumscribing the range of my discussion may necessarily
limit what I have to say to just the European-American
artworld. I do not take this as a grave limitation; we all have
our contexts and our perspectives. To locate a theory in a
context and thereby limit it to that context may be less
ambitious than to create a theory that transcends cultural
context, but to do the latter involves inherent dangers that
make that level of ambition potentially unwise.
Each of the production theories under discussion here purports
to be essentialist. Although I would be surprised to learn that
any one of these theorists made an explicit issue out of the
completeness of his theory, I take it that these theorists

believed that their accounts captured what is fundamentally
the case about artistic value. This assumption on my part is
necessary if I am to argue against their completeness. If I am
wrong in this, it needs to be shown.
I will not discuss my rejection of object-intrinsic value
accounts here. I take that up a bit in the "Artistic Value"
paper, and the arguments that focus on epistemological access
problems to intrinsic value properties as well as the
metaphysical problems in trying to come to grips with the
nature of these properties are well known. At the very least, if
not reason for outright rejection of such theories, the problems
warrant avoidance of inclusion of them here. Whether the
instrumental accounts discussed in this paper produce values
that are intrinsic or instrumental for the production of still
other values is a secondary matter and one beyond the
present scope.[8]
Given that the accounts I am considering are instrumentalist in
nature, the obvious first question to be asked is: Do real world
experiences of artworks always produce the "deliverable" that
such instrumental accounts promise? My strategy in criticizing
the individual theories will follow this question.
2. Beardsley's Aesthetic Account
Beardsley's original account of artistic value comes from his
1958 book, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of
Criticism[9], in the chapters entitled "Critical Evaluation" and
"Aesthetic Value." There he described the three General
Canons of aesthetic merit in works of art: the degree of unity
or disunity in a work, the degree of complexity or simplicity,
and the degree of intensity or lack of intensity.[10] Each of
these canons represents some quality of an aesthetic
experience rather than of an aesthetic object per se, though
these qualities are objectively focused, that is, focused on the
formal qualities of the object under aesthetic consideration. He
writes:
"First, an aesthetic experience is one in which attention is
firmly fixed upon heterogeneous but interrelated components
of a phenomenally objective field - visual or auditory patterns,
or the characters and events in literature... Second, it is an
experience of some intensity... But this discussion already
anticipates the two other features of aesthetic experience,
which may both be subsumed under unity. For, third, it is an
experience that hangs together, or is coherent, to an
unusually high degree. Fourth, it is an experience that is
unusually complete in itself... [B]ecause of the highly
concentrated, or localized, attention characteristic of aesthetic
experience, it tends to mark itself out from the general stream
of experience, and stand in memory as a single experience....
One aesthetic experience may differ from another in any or all
of three connected but independent respects... I propose to
say that one aesthetic experience has a greater magnitude that is, it is more of an aesthetic experience - than another;
and that its magnitude is a function of at least these three
variables."[11]
The subjective focus of Beardsley's criteria come out more
strongly in his 1979 revised list,[12] and the instrumental
character comes out strongly when he writes:

" 'X has greater aesthetic value than Y' means 'X has the
capacity to produce an aesthetic experience of greater
magnitude (such an experience having more value) than that
produced by Y.' Since this definition defines '"aesthetic value'
in terms of consequences, an objects's utility or
instrumentality to a certain sort of experience, I shall call it an
Instrumentalist definition of 'aesthetic value.' "[13]
It is the marriage, so to speak, of his chapter on "Aesthetic
Value" with his chapter on "Critical Evaluation" that establishes
the point that Beardsley understands artistic value in terms of
aesthetic value. The union is strengthened when he writes:
"[A]n artwork can be usefully defined as an intentional
arrangement of conditions for affording experiences with a
marked aesthetic character."[14]
While it may well be true that one can take an aesthetic
perspective, in line with Beardsley's description of it, to any
object (so long as that object is phenomenal or in principle
sensory), it would be odd indeed if that perspective turned out
to be appropriate when it comes to many of the objects
created within the past century. Aesthetic accounts of artistic
value, when they are presented as complete analyses of
artistic value, suffer from the presence of too many available
counterexamples. Consider Marcel Duchamp's In Advance of a
Broken Arm. It is physically a snow shovel; it is green and red
and was purchased by Duchamp right off the rack. In Advance
of a Broken Arm, like any other of Duchamp's so-called
Readymades, was not originally a work of art. However, the
adoption of it by Duchamp as art rendered the object art, or
at least his act introduced the candidacy of the object to be
recognized as art.
What makes the snow shovel with which Duchamp left the
hardware store different from the ones he left behind?
Physically the set of snow shovels is identical. We know this,
because were they different from one another, Duchamp's
statement in choosing the shovel to be "elevated" above the
rest would be lost. Readymades are all essentially not
physically distinctive. This being the case, we would well say of
someone in a gallery setting who was concentrating on the
phenomenal features of the shovel that he "just didn't get it,"
that given the historical context of the object, an aesthetic
perspective is not only inappropriate for reaching the true
value of In Advance of a Broken Arm as a work of art, but it
will prove rather, perhaps distinctly, unrewarding. In Advance
of a Broken Arm is but one of a long list of similar works.
Recent art exhibitions have only added fuel to this. Damien
Hirst, one of the Young British Artists, recently found himself,
with artist Christopher Ofili, at the center of a major
controversy surrounding the Brooklyn Art Museum's exhibition
of a show entitled Sensation. If Hirst's work, or at least these
pieces, has artistic value, surely it does not lie in its potential
to create in viewers experiences that are aesthetic. To add yet
a bit more to this point, the famed Sister Wendy Becket says,
in allusion to the work of Jasper Johns, as she is discussing the
conceptual nature of Modern Art:
"[W]hat he really want to communicate is an idea. Is this a
flag or is it a work of art? A concept? Now this conceptual art

is very popular at the moment - popular with the artworld, not
with the rest of us. And often you see the stuff; you get the
concept, and then you move on. You've lost interest. So here's
another question: When is conceptual art great art? And the
answer is: when it gives deep visual satisfaction, like Jasper
John's flag."[15]
Sister Wendy draws a distinction between conceptual art which
gives deep visual satisfaction and conceptual art which does
not. I take "deep visual satisfaction" to constitute a rewarding
aesthetic engagement, using the word "aesthetic" in line with
Beardsley's views. She suggests that a good deal of conceptual
art does not provide any satisfaction except a cognitive one,
and there is a slight suggestion that this cognitive engagement
is at times fleeting, perhaps even unrewarding. It is just the
distinction that Sister Wendy points out that is at issue here.
The conclusion has to be that aesthetic experiences and art
experiences - if it makes sense to use that second expression
- are essentially different things. There are many aesthetic
experiences that are not experiences focused on art objects.
Certainly that's uncontroversial. But there are a good many art
experiences, if indeed we want to follow the artworld's lead on
what counts as art, which are not best viewed aesthetically -which when viewed aesthetically actually lose value. This
problem makes it appear that aesthetic-experience production
theories cannot be the whole story.[16]
3. Goodman's Cognitivist Account
I take Goodman's account from his book, Languages of
Art,[17] in which he theorizes that art is essentially symbolic.
A given work of art functions as a symbol (or sign), or a set of
symbols. Goodman differentiates between art symbol systems
and non-art symbol systems through a series of
distinctions.[18] This is of course important because there are
many symbol systems that have nothing to do with art. One of
the first things to recognize about Goodman's theory is that it
is, at heart, a representational theory. If works of art are
symbols, they must refer. To what they refer is not really the
point, but reference is essential. "The plain fact is that a
picture, to represent an object, must be a symbol for it, stand
for it, refer to it."[19]
The second thing to recognize is that symbol systems are
human creations, human developments, and must be learned
in order to be applied and to be understood, or, in Goodman's
terms, "read." "Pictures in perspective have to be read; and
the ability to read has to be acquired."[20]
Perhaps the most important thing about Goodman's theory for
present purposes is its focus not on the sensory or
phenomenal, but on the cognitive. Goodman writes:
"Use of symbols beyond immediate need is for the sake of
understanding, not practice; what compels is the urge to
know, what delights is discovery, and communication is
secondary to the apprehension and formulation of what is to
be communicated. The primary purpose is cognition in and for
itself; the practical, pleasure, compulsion, and communicative
utility all depend upon this. Symbolization, then, is to be
judged fundamentally by how well it serves the cognitive

purpose: by the delicacy of its discriminations and the aptness
of its allusions; by the way it works in grasping, exploring, and
informing the world; by how it analyses, sorts, orders, and
organizes; by how it participates in the making, manipulation,
retention, and transformation of knowledge."[21]
This clearly places the cognitive function in the center as
regards both the understanding of what art is (the definitional
component) and assessing whether a given work of art
succeeds and to what degree it succeeds (the evaluative
component).
Does Goodman's account succeed? I would reject Goodman's
theory as a complete account of artistic value because, while
we all no doubt have had the experience of attending to a
work of art in a problem-solving or puzzle-solving frame of
mind, the very fact that we can identify when our experience
of art is cognitive suggests a distinction from those art
experiences that are not. I can take a puzzle-solving attitude
toward an art object, working out for myself the internal logic
of the piece, the rules that this particular artwork instantiates
and follows, and even, for good measure, understanding how
the object refers to and represents other things.
But I can just as easily, even through a conscious and
volitional choice, adopt an attitude of passive acceptance of
what is being offered (to my senses), taking delight merely in
the sensory stimulations themselves or in how they make me
feel. I am not very familiar with the technical aspects of
music, so my entree into appreciating it is generally through
the affective. I am more familiar with the technical aspects of
dance, but I find I can move between two attitudes, one
cognitive and the other not, easily and fluidly.
While a critical appraisal of the object under consideration may
issue forth from the cognitive-engagement frame of mind
more readily or easily than from a different frame - keeping in
mind that we are considering value here - I submit that this is
in large part because linguistic articulation of the value that I
am experiencing flows more easily or readily when I am
already cognitively engaged. Words flow a bit less fluidly when
my mind-set is emotive or purely focused on the phenomenal.
But I would suggest that on many occasions, the value of the
work under review is heightened when considered from a noncognitive vantage point. While Goodman does not discount the
emotive or the sensory - as Beardsley does not discount the
cognitive - his primary focus in accounting for artistic value is
centrally lodged in the cognitive, and this seems too narrow.
4. Tolstoy's Affective Account
Leo Tolstoy envisioned art as essentially a form of
communication.[22] Art is meant to communicate universal
emotion, which is felt by the artist and is the subject of her
work, and is then communicated to her audience. It is not
enough for the artist to have felt something and produce some
artifact resulting from that feeling. What has to take place, for
the work of art to be successful, is for us to feel what the
artist felt, or at least for us to feel what the artist's work can
make us feel.
Every true work of art causes the viewer to enter into a special

relationship with the artist, and not only with the artist, but
with everyone else who has at one time or other entered into
that same relationship. The "artistic relationship" between
artist and audience builds a community, a community of
creator, of object, and of all those who experience the object.
The artist's job is to evoke in herself some feeling once
experienced, and then, once having evoked it in herself, to
communicate it to her audience through some sensual
medium, through colors, shapes, melodies, harmonies, figures,
movements, and so on. The artist seeks to infect her audience
with these feelings: "the degree of infectiousness is the sole
measure of excellence in art." "Infectiousness" translates into
how intensely the viewer experiences the artist's emotion, how
clearly she feels it, and how sincere it is.
Problems with affective theories were known very early.
Tolstoy's contemporary expressionist theorists, Benedetto
Croce and R. G. Collingwood, had already created theories that
jettisoned the focus on pure feeling and the infectious
communication of that feeling for expression of, in Croce's
case, intuitions, and in Collingwood's case, individualized
emotion properly explored, contextualized, and demonstrated.
However, interpretation of art that focuses on the affective is
still alive and well. Consider the following from Sister Wendy:
"I'm not afraid you won't think this Mark Rothko beautiful, but
what I am afraid, a little, somebody might think it's just
beautiful. Lovely colors. No meaning. But meaning is what he
was all about, and he would have been furiously angry if
anyone thought that, and told you so in suitably salty
language. It was subject matter that mattered most to him.
And the subject matter was the emotions. Not small, personal
emotions - up today, down tomorrow - but the great timeless
emotions. How we feel about death, and courage, and ecstacy.
He was convinced that if you would just encounter his
paintings, that emotion would be communicated to you with
absolute clarity. So to achieve this he painted very large.
Because in a small painting - big you, little painting - you can
control it. But with a large painting, it controls you. You're
taken into it. Unless of course you look at it from a distance,
that killing, assessing look. So to combat that, he insisted that
always the light be very dim, so you couldn't actually see the
thing until you were right up against it. And then something
does begin to happen. He painted with very thin mists of
paint, feathering it on, breathing it on. And you are taken up,
out of yourself, into something greater, something
transcendent and majestic. If you can think of a religious
painting without religion, this is what you experience here. It's
so timeless, that when I've had this encounter, I feel to return
to the world of time, I have to shake my head and bring
myself down to earth again."[23]
Sister Wendy's work is as good a popular sort of art
interpretation as any, I imagine, and if affective treatments
like the one she offers of, and actually ascribes to, Mark
Rothko, are still effective in communicating the value of a
work, then affective production theories belong in this paper
(although I will admit that I went for the easiest and most
straightforward one with Tolstoy).
One problem for the production-of-emotion model is that

degree to which the feeling must be, to use Tolstoy's work,
infected. Clearly Tolstoy's artistic aim is not simply cognitive
appreciation of the expression of emotion. The emotion has to
be felt by the audience. But then the questions are: How and
How Much? The edict to infect the audience with a sincere
level of the feeling being expressed leaves one with these
sorts of question. Another problem is understanding or
accessing artist intentions as they constitute the source of the
artist's emotions. Though we commonly expect that the artist
can and probably does know her intention regarding a given
art creation, and though she can communicate this to others
who wish to criticize, interpret or merely appreciate her work,
the intention of the artist is often something that cannot be
readily discovered.
Although one can be reasonably certain of, say, Michelangelo's
intention regarding the creation of the Pieta, a casual viewer at
New York's Museum of Modern Art may be hard pressed to
explain the intention behind any one of the mature, untitled
works of Jackson Pollock. The difficulty here is a simple one.
How is it that we can know that a work contains or is an
expression of emotion? This may be obvious in many works,
but this is a more difficult task when it comes to formalized or
highly abstract works. If one is relegated to having to fathom
the intention of the artist in order to determine whether the
work is an expression of emotion, one may find oneself silent.
This problem, coupled with the earlier one, renders
expressive-affective theories of artistic value lacking.
5. Goldman's Alternative World Account
Alan Goldman, in his Aesthetic Value, offers a production
account of value. His view is broad, incorporating all
perspectives:
"The value of such works lies first in the challenge and
richness of the perceptual, affective, and cognitive experience
they afford. Symbolic and expressive density combines here
with sensuous feel. From the subjective side, all one's
perceptual, cognitive, and affective capacities can be engaged
in apprehending these relations, even if one's grasp of them is
imperfect or only implicit. These different facets of
appreciation are not only engaged simultaneously but are also
often indissolubly united, as when formal relations amount
musical tones or painted shapes are experienced as felt
tensions and resolutions and perhaps as higher-order or some
ordinary emotions as well."[24]
His account is this:
"When we are so fully and satisfyingly involved in appreciating
an artwork, we can be said to lose our ordinary, practically
oriented selves in a world of the work.... [It] can engage us so
fully as to constitute another world for us, at least
temporarily."[25]
Goldman evades complaints about narrowness of scope in
constructing a theory that is very broad indeed. In the
production of experiences of alternate worlds, the artwork can
trigger a huge range of different sorts of experiences that will
be subjectively efficacious. For me, a single combination of
smells can invoke another whole world (in my case, cigarettes,

perfume, and diesel exhaust put me in London instantly and
thoroughly). If one has a whole book or an entire film in which
to develop alternate world cues and contexts, the effect - if
the book or film is good - will surely be pronounced. Just think
of all the people influenced by Tolkien's trilogy and who, even
these decades later, have never really gotten back out of
Middle Earth. If Goldman's account is so broad, and if we take
it to constitute a theory of artistic value, then is there any
criticism left to make of it? If the "deliverable" that Goldman
promises as the instrumental product of art is so broad, and
can be produced in such an incredible variety and number of
ways, does his account fully succeed?
6. The Modification Problem
I have only one criticism left, but it is a criticism of all
production theories of artistic value. One difficulty for all of the
accounts we surveyed, Goldman's included, concerns
modification of the object under consideration. If the worth of
an art object is grounded in its potential for producing
aesthetic experiences of a decently high magnitude, and better
works of art are those that produce experiences of higher
magnitudes (to use Beardsley's word, but to think of this in
terms of each of the accounts) than lesser works of art, then it
would seem that we could do artworks and art audiences a
service if we modify works of art of lesser artistic quality in
ways that enhance their artistic value.
In 1919, Duchamp drew a moustache on the Mona Lisa and
named it L.H.O.O.Q. Duchamp did not draw a moustache on
the actual Mona Lisa, of course, but on a copy. If Duchamp
had drawn a moustache on the original Mona Lisa, the one
painted by Leonardo's own hand, then I would wager that very
few people would have been okay with that. In 1959, Robert
Rauschenberg asked Willem de Kooning for permission to
erase one of his drawings. De Kooning gave his permission,
the erasure was made, and the erased drawing was displayed
under Rauschenberg's name with the title Erased De Kooning
Drawing.
While Rauschenberg was able to get away with this, he could
do it only once - Rauschenberg was the right artist in the right
context at the right time - and he did it only after securing de
Kooning's permission. No doubt there are other cases of
artistic modification, but the number is extremely small. In
general, art audiences believe there is something seriously
wrong about the modification of a work of art. Yet, if the value
rests exclusively in the productive value of the work, and the
"deliverable" can be increased through modification - either by
the artist herself at some point after the work has been
presented for viewing or by another, perhaps more gifted,
artist - then artistic modification should not affect us so.
Indeed, in many situations, we should welcome it.
I want to be clear here in saying that in rejecting wide-spread
modification of works of art, I am trying to account for what I
take to be a very strong intuition about art. I believe there is
a strong intuition that once a work of art is complete -- once
the artist has set aside her brushes or chisels or pen -- the
work has a certain value in terms of its being a work of art. To
modify a completed work is to jeopardize that value, to put it
at risk or even to destroy it. Even in those cases where one

owns a work of art, modification of that work - say, cutting it
to fit a particular frame - seems a cause of distress to art
lovers, regardless of considerations of property rights.
The value of art transcends property ownership, or at least the
intuition of many art lovers is that it does. What value
completed works of art have is what is at issue in this paper,
but one thing seems very clear: Production accounts of the
value of art do not and cannot take seriously the intuition that
most lovers of art feel about the prohibition against modifying
works of art. Production theories cannot account for this.
The value at issue here is the value the work has in virtue of
its being a work of art. Surely there are many contextual or
historical features of works of art that add to, or perhaps even
primarily account for, the value of certain works - provenance,
the ability of a work of art to communicate great religious
meaning, teach a valuable moral lesson, or serve as a source
of social or political unification - but I mean to focus narrowly
on the artistic value of these works.
One may argue that there are at least three reasons why
permission to modify artworks does not work as a counterargument to production theories. First, modification does not,
as a matter of fact, increase the artistic value of modified
works of art. Second, the modified work of art is no longer the
same work of art as the original; it is a separate and distinct
second work. And, third, the reasons that we find modification
of works of art objectionable is not because of considerations
of artistic value, but because modification actually diminishes
the value of the work in other ways.
In response to the first point, that modification does not, as a
matter of fact, increase the artistic value of modified works, I
would make two points. First, my argument concerning
modification is a logical one, not an empirical or contingent
one. Production theories allow the possibility of valueenhancement through modification, and if we find modification
objectionable, then we should reject production theories of
artistic value. To say that modified works are never artistically
better than the original works, in a way where this claim is not
empirical and contingent, requires a theory of artistic value,
and this is precisely what is at issue. To use as evidence the
facts that we do not find modified works better is to leave
open the possibility that we may in some future cases.
The second point I would make in response to this first
objection is that there may be, right now, cases where we
think modified works are superior. I think few people would
believe that Duchamp's L.H.O.O.Q. is a superior work to
Leonardo's Mona Lisa, but I am not as secure in this same
intuition when it comes to Rauschenberg's Erased De Kooning
Drawing. I do not know what the original De Kooning drawing
looked like, but I know that Rauschenberg's work is, to the
extent that there is any agreement about such things, a work
of art of some value.
Throughout this paper I tend to focus on paintings, but we
may consider other art forms. It is certainly within the realm of
possibilities that a majority of people find colorized versions of
certain films better than the originals. Ted Turner may be a
member of such a majority. Younger viewers or simply those

without much experience of black-and-white film or television
may find colorized versions of films more aesthetically
accessible and so perhaps more engaging. Better examples
may come from music, where variations by composers of the
works of earlier composers are standard. The chances are
great, I would wager, that a majority of listeners actually find
Mozart's variations better than their originals, for instance,
Mozart's variation on Salieri's Mio Caro Adone. But one may
argue that Mozart's Mio Caro Adone and Salieri's Mio Caro
Adone are different works, as Frank Capra's original It's a
Wonderful Life is a different film from Ted Turner's colorized
version.
This then leads us to the second objection, that in the
examples I offer we are not talking straightforwardly about
one work that undergoes modification; we are rather talking
about two separate works: the original and the modified
version. This is, one may argue, why some (although not
Woody Allen) find colorization of films acceptable. One is not
damaging the original film in making a colorized copy;[26] one
is creating a separate film. This is perhaps even easier to say
in the case of musical variations.
This sort of position is consonant with the view of Mark
Sagoff[27] concerning artwork restoration and copying. Sagoff
argues that works of art are highly individual because they are
the products of a particular artistic process. If that work
undergoes a secondary process, not part of the original
process of the original artist, the resulting work is no longer
the original work but a second new work. Sagoff talks about
the restoration of Michelangelo's Pietà after it was attacked
with a hammer in 1972. He praises the restorer, Redig de
Campos, for taking pains to ensure that what changes he
made to restore the Pietà to a condition that is visually
undetectable from its pre-1972 state could be easily detected
and easily reversed by future restorers or caretakers of the
work. The 1972 lunatic changed Michelangelo's Pietà; to
change it further, even with the intent of (phenomenally)
restoring it to its original state would not be to reverse the
imposition of the lunatic's "new process" but actually to add a
third "process" to the history of this work.
I should point out that I am in great sympathy with Sagoff's
ultimate point, which I take to be a rejection of Beardsleystyle arguments for artistic value being a matter of production
of aesthetic experiences, and with his ancillary point
concerning the impermissibility of modification. The only place
I part company with him is over the ontological status of the
modified work. I differ for two reasons. First, while it may be
readily acceptable that Mozart's Mio Caro Adone and Salieri's
Mio Caro Adone are different works, this is less clear in the
Rauschenberg/de Kooning case. Should we rather say that de
Kooning's drawing has ceased to exist or say that
Rauschenberg's work is an evolution of de Kooning's? Were I
de Kooning, I would certainly prefer the latter, and it would be
on that basis that I would be motivated to grant permission
for the erasure to be done.
My intuition is that de Kooning is every bit as important as a
part of the artistic process which resulted in Erased De Kooning
Drawing as is Rauschenberg. Rauschenberg did not erase any

old thing. He erased a de Kooning drawing. The de Kooning
drawing was not destroyed or made to cease to exist; it was
one step of a single artistic process that resulted in the work
Erased De Kooning Drawing. But more to the point, the
"provenancial process" that led to the creation of this work did
indeed include a modification of one artist's artwork (a bona
fide artwork in its own right) by another artist, who, I have to
imagine, was motivated to create a work of greater artistic
value, greater artistic significance, than the original drawing.
Based on the attention that Erased De Kooning Drawing has
received in the artworld, my intuition is that they succeeded.
My second reason for differing with Sagoff is this. When an
artist creates a work of art, it is the artist herself who, at
some point of her own choosing, pronounces a work complete.
From a non-practitioner's point of view, I may be tempted to
call this point arbitrary. The difference between a painting with
one less (minute) brush stroke and one more (minute) one is,
in the vast majority of paintings throughout the history of art,
not significant. Certainly some paintings could not bear one
stroke more or less, but this is, in art history, a small minority
of works.
Whether my intuition about this is shared or not does not
matter; the point is this: If an artist pronounced a work
complete but two days later reconsidered and put in a few
more brush strokes, it is difficult to see how this meaningfully
constitutes the imposition of a second artistic process. (I
wager that most writers of philosophy papers have had the
experience of believing a paper to be complete, but then
having another thought and returning to the computer.) I
contend that what this returning artist does to her work is on
a continuum with what Rauschenberg did to the de Kooning
drawing. The difference is one of degree but not of kind. If this
is the case, the modification of one work which results not in a
second work but rather merely an evolution of the first original
work is a possibility. If such modification is a possibility,
production theories of artistic value allow for it.
The last objection I want to take up concerns whether the
modification of works of art is objectionable because of artistic
value considerations or because modification diminishes the
value of the work in other ways. A good example of this comes
from a world related to the artworld, the world of antiques,
specifically antique furniture.[28] A chair, say, that is quite old
will have become dark and dull with age. The novice collector
of such an antique chair may think that he can restore the
chair to its original brilliant condition by stripping off the finish
and putting a new, probably more protective, finish in its
place. This will bring out the woodgrain, brighten up the piece,
and, generally, make the piece more directly aesthetically
pleasing. The problem with this, as all viewers of the Antiques
Roadshow will know, is that such a restorative act will actually
diminish the worth, i.e., the value, of the chair immensely. The
value, it may be argued, that needs to be protected is not the
aesthetic value per se but rather the value of the chair as
something that has been around a very long time, a value of
longevity that is indicated in its economic value.
I have two answers to this. First, modification of the chair in
this example is motivated precisely by a theory of (artistic)

value that I reject. In this example, one modifies the chair to
enhance one's (direct, sensory) aesthetic experience of the
chair. The chair unmodified, on the other hand, has a much
closer connection to the chair that was, to return to Sagoff's
view, the product of the process of a particular artist or, in this
case, the furniture maker. But this answer does not perhaps
get at the root of the objection. So, second, I would answer
that my goal in this paper is not to put forward a theory of
artistic value. I do that elsewhere. My goal is simply to show
that production theories of artistic value are insufficient. This
being the case, it may be that considerations such as longevity
do indeed play a role to a sufficient degree (or sufficient
degrees) of artistic value, perhaps even along the lines hinted
at above. I am not obliged to say at this point how this would
be.
Production theories of artistic value inherently and logically
allow the modification of art works where that modification will
enhance the instrumental "deliverable" effectiveness. If we
believe that art work modification, on the whole, is not
appropriate, then production theories suffer. The embracing of
modification by production theories is necessary because their
very logic is predicated not on the value of the object per se
but on the experience of the viewer. The better the
experience, the higher the artistic worth of the object that
produces it. The better the object, the better the experience.
Modify away!
7. A Non-Instrumental, Extrinsic Value Account
I have not in this paper offered a strong argument against
modification, and to some degree I have celebrated the
modification by Rauschenberg of de Kooning's drawing. The
case against the general modification of works of art is made
to some degree in the paper where I advance a theory of
artistic value, but essentially this case rests on very widely
shared intuitions. It is indeed the rare individual, even the rare
libertarian capitalist, who would believe that once he owns a
work of art, it is really his to do with as he wishes. Owners of
artworks are caretakers of something whose full value cannot
be measured on the same scale or in the same terms as the
scope of their ownership.
The modification problem is a species of a larger problem, and
that concerns the way in which we actually do value art. We
build museums and galleries for art works, and industrialists
pay millions of dollars for a single piece. But we do not do this
for any other objects or events that possess or deliver the
value(s) that production theories claim for art. We do not build
such houses or pay such prices for purely aesthetic objects, or
purely cognitive objects (the closest would be an arena for
chess matches; puzzle museums don't count), or purely
emotive objects (the closest is a movie theatre, but that's only
if the film, either the particular film or film in general, does not
count as art).
If we understand the "symptoms" of real-world valuing in
terms of money and care, works of art have a value that far
surpasses the price of pigment and canvas, etc., in the actual
world. For us to say that their value lies in producing certain
experiential states (or, really, producing anything) should be
to say that we would pay and care equally for non-art objects

that produce those same sorts of states, but in reality we do
not. To chalk this up to our being acculturated or socialized to
take care of art, without regard for these philosophical
considerations of its value, is not to do service to the fields of
everyone reading this journal.
In my paper "Artistic Value," I argue for an alternative to
production theories. It seems to me that even if we reject
object intrinsic artistic value accounts, this leaves us not just
with instrumental accounts but with extrinsic accounts, of
which instrumental accounts are a species. I suggest that we
consider, as an extrinsic account of artistic value, a focus not
on the audience but on the artist herself. The value of a work
of art is located subjectively in individuals who respect the art
object as the product of the artist, her time, talent, skills,
labor, concentration, and perhaps above all as the instantiation
of her valuable and irreducible expression. The respect we
accord a given art object is borne on a respect for the artist's
efforts.
This jibes well I think with the actual way we - perhaps "we"
as Westerners - value art. We tend to understand and
appreciate art in terms of who it came from, who the artist
was, what her influence was, and the rest. This may not be a
good thing, it may be snobbish and elitist and impure and all
the rest, but it explains our ordinary experiences with art. It
explains why an industrialist will pay millions for a Monet. It
explains what we choose to house in the Louvre, the National
Gallery, the Tate, and MOMA.
This view is argued for in that previous paper, of course, so it
does not make sense to repeat the argument here. I simply
wanted to close with this suggestion so that my rejection of
production theories of artistic value could end on a positive
note.
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